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The field of international relations (IR) is fragmented along several lines, some 
stirring more debate than others: Theoretical divides have been discussed ad nauseam in the 
so-called “great debates”; the split between qualitative and quantitative methods remains a 
recurring theme of discussion; disciplinary walls continue to structure academia; and the 
differences between European and North American traditions have flowed into recent 
fashionable exchanges. Countless conferences and publications have documented these 
divides, often calling for new bridges across those lines (Hellmann 2003). Answering these 
calls, an increasing number of books and articles in IR develop middle-range theories, rely 
on mixed methods, borrow from several disciplines, and are co-authored by researchers 
from different countries. Yet, fewer studies have addressed the mutual ignorance of the 
different thematic areas of IR – supposedly united by a joint interest in international affairs – 
and explored potential avenues for bridging them.  
Global environmental governance (GEG) is one of these thematic islands of the IR 
archipelago. It has its own key journals (such as Global Environmental Politics), its inescapable 
classical references (such as Garrett Hardin’s Tragedy of the Common), and its own research 
program (such as a persistent interest in regime theory). GEG scholars read, cite, criticize 
and build on each other. However, they remain relatively insulated from the rest of the 
archipelago, and, reciprocally, other subfields in IR pay relatively little attention to GEG 
(Dyer 2010).  
This thematic isolation is regrettable. When ideas have the opportunity to navigate 
across various thematic areas, their cross-fertilization often leads to scientific innovations. As 
Adam Smith noted, “when the mind is employed about a variety of objects it is somehow 
expanded and enlarged” (1766: 539). Individuals with various interests, participating in 
heterogeneous social networks, and acquainted with diverse viewpoints are more likely to be 
creative. This positive relation between diversity of interests and greater innovation holds 
true for artists (Uzzi and Spiro 2005), for start-up entrepreneurs (Ruef 2002), and 
presumably for IR scholars as well.   
To be sure, there are incidences of cross-fertilizations between GEG and other 
subfields of IR. Generalist journals in IR occasionally publish GEG articles. International 
Organization published a special issue on environmental politics as early as 1972, when the 
subfield of GEG was not yet well structured. Since then, some ideas have occupied both 
GEG scholars and experts from other subfields to their mutual benefit, such as the concept 
of epistemic community, the link between environmental scarcity and military conflicts, or 
the expansion of security to the environmental realm. But arguably, these incidences of 
cross-fertilizations are too few and far between. Climate change negotiations occasionally 
attract attention from outside the GEG subfield, but other environmental regimes – dealing 
with biodiversity, whaling, desertification, migratory species, dangerous wastes, fisheries, 
freshwater, deforestation, acid rain, ozone layer, biosafety, Antarctic and outer space 
pollution, to name a few, remain largely ignored.     
We are not the first to signal lost opportunities for cross-fertilization between GEG 
and IR. Writing twenty years ago, Steve Smith predicted that GEG would always stay at the 
periphery of IR. For him, the dominant Westphalian paradigm was simply too much at odds 
with the global nature of several environmental problems: “Because the discipline of 
international relations is so obsessed with the state, then just as the state can treat 
environmental issues as of a relatively minor importance, in deeds if not in words, so must 
the mainstream of the subject keep to where the action is” (Smith 1993:43).  
However, since Smith wrote these lines in the early 1990s, both world politics and its 
study have changed drastically. There are currently more opportunities than ever for mutual 
enrichment between GEG and other subfields of IR. Globalization, in particular, has lifted 
several empirical justifications for keeping GEG separated from IR mainstream studies. For 
one, the traditional distinction between high and low politics that had kept environmental 
issues at a subordinate level has disappeared. IR experts in all its subfields are now struggling 
to make sense of global interdependence and GEG scholars might actually be a step ahead 
of other subfields. As noted by Oran Young, “innovative approaches to governance have 
had the greatest impact on issues pertaining to natural resources and the environment” 
(1997:2). Under this perspective, the “international environmental politics literature 
anticipates many of the descriptive features of globalization” (Haas 2010).  
Two broad themes associated with globalization have especially retained the 
attention of GEG scholars and offer significant prospects for cross-fertilization with other 
IR subfields.  The first is the study of international institutions. The concept of international 
regime is by far the “most used entry point for environmental topics in IR” (Boardman 
1997: 35; see also Young et al. 2008). While other subfields in IR have perhaps too quickly 
discarded regime theory following some initial enthusiasm in the 1980s, GEG kept this 
concept at the center of its theoretical endeavors. It has, however, deviated from the initial 
question of regime formation to explore other issues such as regime evolution, regime 
complexes, regime effectiveness, non-regimes, or private regimes. Recently, regimes were the 
units of analysis of an interesting GEG project aimed at quantitatively comparing 
cooperation across various environmental issue-areas (Breitmeier et al. 2011).  
Figure 1 illustrates this strong interest for international regimes. It presents the 
results of a keyword search in titles and abstracts of articles published from 2001 to 2012 in 
one GEG journal, Global Environmental Politics (316 articles), two generalist IR journals, 
International Organization (386 articles) and International Studies Quarterly (617 articles). The 
search for the keyword “regime”, excluding keywords starting with “democra” to distinguish 
international regimes from regime types, generated 75 results in Global Environmental Politics. 
In comparison, it generated only 30 results in International Organization, despite the fact that 
this journal had launched the research program on international regimes with a widely 
celebrated special issue in 1982. The interest of the GEG literature for international 
institutions is such that the World Trade Organization, despite being a non-environmental 
organization, is mentioned more frequently in titles and abstracts of articles published in 
Global Environmental Politics than of those of International Organization and International Studies 
Quarterly, two leading journals in international political economy. 
 







































A second distinctive feature of the GEG literature is the study of non-state actors in 
world politics.1 In GEG, as noted recently by Frank Biermann and Philipp Pattberg, “actors 
beyond central governments have taken center stage in many policy processes” (2012: 2). To 
study these actors, GEG scholars have developed interesting analytical tools related to 
transnational networks, private partnerships, norm entrepreneurs, transparency and 
inclusiveness, private regulations, and public debates.  
As presented in Figure 1, the keywords “NGO” and “non-governmental 
organization” appear in the title or the abstract of 7.9% of the articles published in Global 
Environmental Politics from 2001 to 2012, a rate significantly higher than in International 
Organization (0.8%) or International Studies Quarterly (2.3%). If one expands the search to 
articles studying business organizations, indigenous groups, scientists, terrorist organizations, 
and social movements, it appears that 90 articles published in Global Environmental Politics, or 
28.5% of the total, study non-state actors.  
Interestingly, recurring research questions in the study of both international 
institutions and non-state actors in the GEG literature concern interactions. Several studies 
investigate how different institutions or different non-state actors interact with one another, 
                                                            
1  Additional themes in the GEG literature that could be of interest for other IR scholars include 
comparative foreign policy, negotiations dynamics, North-South relations, hegemonic discourses, or the role of 
ethics in world politics. They do not appear, however, as prominent and distinctive as the two identified themes 
of international institutions and non-state actors. 
or how non-state actors interact with international institutions. Some recent studies even 
explore how interactions among non-state actors impact interactions among institutions 
(Visseren-Hamakers 2011; Morin and Orsini tbp). This concern for interactions between 
different units might well be inspired by an ecosystemic view, according to which the 
evolution of a system is contingent upon the diversity of units and their complex 
interactions.  
The purpose of this forum is not to argue that GEP offers an ecosystemic 
perspective that can replace traditional approaches to IR (Boardman 1997; Dyer 2010). GEG 
scholars do not share such a parallel grand theory. GEG has cultivated its diversity by 
working on several, less ambitious, middle-level analytical concepts.   
Rather, this forum presents several of these recent innovative concepts and discusses 
their potential value for the development of other IR subfields. To be sure, distinctive 
features of environmental politics limit the external validity of certain GEG conceptual 
insights. Nevertheless, the environmental subfield is livelier today than ever before, and at 
least some of its innovative concepts and insights can be enlightening for IR in general. 
This collection of essays brings together scholars from various disciplines, based on 
three continents, with different theoretical and methodological interests, but all active in the 
subfield of GEG. Each of them reviews the emerging literature around one specific 
conceptual innovation of GEG, related to one of the two core themes of GEG: 
International regimes or non-state actors. Beyond a review of the literature, each 
contribution hypothesizes on the reasons why GEG played a pioneer role in this concept 
and discusses its transferability to other subfields of IR.  
The first contribution by Hélène Trudeau, Isabelle Duplessis and Suzanne Lalonde 
recalls the way global environmental regimes have been legally codified, by reviewing law-
making techniques in GEG. These regimes are increasingly in interaction with one another, 
through horizontal interactions detailed in the second contribution by Thijs Van de Graaf 
and Ferdi De Ville on regime complexes; or through vertical interactions detailed in the third 
contribution by Kate O’Neill. The forum then presents the current state of research on non-
state actors with a fourth contribution by Charles Roger and Peter Dauvergne on private 
authority; a fifth contribution by Jean-Frédéric Morin and Sebastian Oberthür on expertise, 
and a sixth contribution by Amandine Orsini and Frank Biermann on transparency. The 
seventh and last contribution, by Hiroshi Otah and Atsushi Ishii, presents, as a synthesis, the 
state of current GEG research regarding the question of the effectiveness of both 
governmental and non-governmental regimes. 
 
Law-Making Techniques in GEG 
 
HÉLÈNE TRUDEAU, ISABELLE DUPLESSIS, AND SUZANNE LALONDE 
University of Montreal 
 
Environmental problems present a distinct challenge for legal processes because of 
the scientific uncertainty which often surrounds them and the unknown parameters of time 
and space in which they manifest themselves (see Morin and Oberthür below). Disputes 
arising from transboundary air or water pollution led to the recognition of the now generally 
accepted obligation that States are not to use their territory or allow others to use it, in a way 
that can harm the interests of other States. However, in response to the challenges posed by 
the interconnectedness of the various components of the environment, international 
environmental law had to evolve and shift away from the traditional inter-State paradigm to 
embrace a more global approach.  
This shift in focus at the international level can also be observed in domestic 
environmental law, if one compares the rules governing properties and private relations 
between individuals with the complex set of rules which define administrative law regimes 
(Hey 2007:750-751). Analysts have in fact suggested that recent GEG instruments present 
many of the features which characterize domestic public law regimes. Those domestic “law-
making techniques”, which to date have been infrequently used at the international level, 
include for instance delegations of powers and the creation of subsidiary and plenary bodies 
responsible for consultative, legislative, executive and even adjudicative functions within the 
scope of specific multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) (Fitzmaurice 2009).  
The present contribution is based on legal doctrine about law-making techniques, but 
the authors acknowledge the need to also address those techniques from different disciplines 
and perspectives. In particular, the role played by law-making techniques in international 
environmental law is to be linked with the more general issue of effectiveness in GEG 
studies. In recent years, effectiveness has been an important theme on the research agendas 
of both legal and political scholars (Chambers 2008:100; Winter 2006; see Ohta and Ishii 
below). In legal terms, effectiveness must be measured by the environmental performance of 
a specific regime and is, in that sense, at least partly the result of specific legal mechanisms 
designed to correctly elaborate norms and ensure their application. MEAs have played a 
pioneer role in that respect in international law (Brunnée 2006).  
One of the reasons explaining why these law-making techniques have been integrated 
into strategies to deal with GEG may have to do with the sense of urgency felt by the 
international community, which is struggling to devise normative responses to potentially 
very destructive situations. For instance, the two legal instruments which were adopted to 
protect the ozone layer – the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol, as subsequently 
amended – offer a whole range of flexible and effective legal mechanisms designed to 
respond to the urgent need of eliminating CFCs and other ozone-depleting substances.  
First, the establishment of a plenary body composed of the member States, the 
Conference of the Parties (Meeting of the Parties for a Protocol), creates a continuous 
political channel through which necessary technical improvements and more substantive 
legal changes can be debated and decided in a timely manner. Second, the plenary body has 
indirect law-making powers to adopt amendments and protocols which must, however, 
ultimately be ratified by the member States, and some direct powers to amend the treaty 
annexes. Amendments to the annexes typically do not require ratification by the member 
States, making their implementation much faster. States, however, usually have the option of 
objecting to any proposed modifications within a certain time frame and as a result, are not 
bound by them (except in the case of the “adjustment” procedure of the Montreal Protocol, 
where this option is not available to reluctant States). Third, the instruments establish 
advisory entities or subsidiary bodies composed of experts to provide regular scientific 
assessments of the situation and suggest necessary actions to the plenary body. Fourth, the 
compliance mechanisms created to facilitate implementation of the obligations are based on 
cooperative instead of adversarial models. Finally, the individual capacity of developing 
countries is taken into account through the operation of financial mechanisms such as the 
Global Environmental Facility. 
To face global threats, the application of very strict measures to control pollution is 
necessary. Compliance with the adopted norms has to be an important part of the 
established regimes if they are to be efficient, even though as such compliance is not to be 
confused with effectiveness (Mitchell 2007:893). One of the most innovative legal techniques 
that are being used in international environmental law to facilitate the respect of norms by 
States is the institution of compliance mechanisms. Traditional mechanisms have not always 
proved efficient in resolving conflicts arising out of GEG issues. Although much work has 
been done by the International Law Commission to further develop rules regarding State 
responsibility, States generally appear very reluctant to submit their dispute to agreed-upon 
jurisdictional instances, such as arbitral tribunals or the International Court of Justice 
(Romano 2007:1036; Pineschi 2009:483). Instead, other ways have emerged to help States 
conform to their obligations in a more flexible and adapted manner (Beyerlin et al. 2006; 
Treves et al. 2009).  
A number of MEAs adopted since the early 1970s contain many of the same 
techniques and mechanisms. The common institutional arrangements usually comprise a 
conference or meeting of the parties, a secretariat and one or more technical subsidiary 
bodies. The main objectives pursued by the treaties themselves may be difficult to attain –
tackling global threats like climate change or the loss of species is no small task – but overall 
the normative model they offer has been considered quite innovative in international law. In 
summary, what is so innovative about these legal regimes is their autonomy in terms of 
institutional arrangements, i.e. by the creation of treaty-based organs outside the realm of 
traditional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). The international regimes have been 
devised with an organizational structure which allows them to respond effectively to a 
myriad of challenges2, to develop their normative content over time as new scientific 
findings become available, and to ensure compliance by member States (Brunnée 2006; 
Beyerlin et al. 2006). 
Law-making techniques and regulatory regimes developed within MEAs have 
recently been integrated into the global governance research agenda. Some analysts have 
suggested that these features hold promise for other spheres of IR. Although in 2000 
                                                            
2 Churchill and Ulfstein (2000) have argued that this phenomenon “marks a distinct and different 
approach to institutionalized collaboration between states, being both more informal and more flexible, and 
often innovative in relation to norm creation and compliance”. 
autonomous institutional arrangements were still considered “a little-noticed phenomenon” 
in international law (Churchill and Ulfstein 2000), the potentiality these arrangements offer 
for reforms, particularly in the realm of human rights law, has attracted increasing doctrinal 
attention (Bowman 2007; Stein and Lord 2010; Morijn 2011).  
The need to adopt stricter rules over time in order to correctly manage situations of 
pollution and eventually achieve an environmental objective is a common parameter of 
almost all MEAs. Adequate responses to such daunting challenges were made possible with 
the creation of what has been termed “the tacit amendment procedure”, by which an 
amendment enters into force for all parties unless objected to within a certain period of time. 
This procedure proved successful not only within the context of MEAs but also within 
certain traditional IGOs and commissions, particularly those dealing with situations of 
pollution or with resource management measures, such as the International Whaling 
Commission and various international fisheries commissions. The International Maritime 
Organization has recently adopted this technique for amendments of a technical character in 
maritime pollution conventions. It is used to limit the inertia of States to “contract in”, thus 
“allowing inertia to operate in favor of progress rather than against it” (Bowman 2007). This 
technique has also been exported to the International Labor Organization through the 
adoption of the 2006 Maritime Labor Convention. It has also been suggested that this so-
called tacit amendment procedure should also be introduced within the context of UN 
Human Rights Conventions reform (Bowman 2007). 
Another feature of MEAs which has been considered of interest for potential 
reforms within the UN conventional realm is the ability to supervise and monitor the respect 
of treaty obligations through the creation of technical committees with advisory functions. 
This could be especially helpful in ensuring follow-up to recommendations by human rights 
treaty bodies, which “should be seen as an essential and integral part of monitoring as a 
human rights protection methodology” (Morijn 2011). Technical committees in MEAs are 
composed of individuals with specialized expertise. They usually have data-gathering 
responsibilities and thematic advisory roles that a treaty-monitoring body alone would be 
unable to perform. They are very well-suited to assist treaty bodies in supporting the 
implementation of conventional obligations by assessing information (Stein and Lord 2010). 
In addition, it has been suggested that the Conference of States Parties established through 
the recently adopted Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006) should 
seek inspiration from MEAs in defining the role it can play (Stein and Lord 2010).  
Plenary bodies created in other subfields of global governance will need to rely on 
some of the same strategies that have proven necessary for environmental protection, such 
as achieving consensus on substantive issues, facilitating implementation of conventional 
obligations by drawing together a wide range of actors and providing resources, and setting 
benchmarks and quantitative goals and targets based on regular information and data 
gathering. 
International environmental regimes, though efficient on some levels, are still not 
sufficient to adequately protect the global environment. In recent years, there have been 
ample calls for the creation of a world environmental organization that could exert a 
stronger influence over other international institutions. This has not proved successful so 
far. Future research directions should therefore aim at filling this gap with other solutions. 
The possibility of more horizontal synergies between existing public and private institutions 
and organizations in GEG as well as in other IR fields could be an interesting avenue to 
explore. 
 
Regime Complexes and Interplay Management 
 
THIJS VAN DE GRAAF AND FERDI DE VILLE 
Ghent University 
 
As outlined in the introduction, one of the key characteristics of GEG is its focus on 
international institutions. Since the turn of the millennium, GEG studies have increasingly 
shifted away from studying the design and effectiveness of discrete institutions to focus on 
the “interaction,” “linkages,” “interplay” and “overlap” between different sets of institutions, 
as well as the broader “regime complexes” or “governance architectures” within which they 
are embedded (e.g. Young 2002; Rosendal 2001; Raustiala and Victor 2004; Biermann et al. 
2009; Oberthür and Gehring 2011). To be sure, various IR scholars from non-environmental 
subfields have, in parallel, also turned their attention to situations where multiple 
international institutions co-govern the same issue (e.g. Alter and Meunier 2009). 
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that researchers from the subfield of GEG have pioneered this 
line of inquiry and have so far produced the largest volume of writings on the subject. 
According to Raustiala (2012: 9), it is no coincidence that concern with “treaty congestion” 
was first raised in the GEG literature in the 1990s: “environmental cooperation was a major 
growth area in this period, and the focus was largely on negotiating new agreements rather 
than implementing existing ones.” 
This contribution highlights three ways in which this large literature can inform 
researchers in other subfields of global governance: (i) by stimulating the emergence of a 
theory on the determinants of regime complexes and their development; (ii) by thinking 
about the normative implications of regime complexes; and (iii) by introducing the novel 
concept of interplay management.  
Before we move on to discuss these three points, some conceptual clarification is in 
order. First, we emphasize the subtle but crucial difference between “fragmentation” and 
“regime complexes.” In a regime complex, the different components are loosely coupled, 
whereas in a totally fragmented architecture such connections are not present. We follow 
Keohane and Victor (2011), who situate regime complexes somewhere in between the two 
extremes of integration and complete fragmentation. Second, we prefer the term “regime 
complex” over the term “regime complexity.” Every empirical phenomenon in international 
relations is complex to a certain degree; yet not every constellation of institutions is a 
complex, defined by the Oxford Dictionary as “a group or system of different things that are 
linked in a close or complicated way.” Third, we recognize that fragmentation is ubiquitous 
and depends on how the issue area at hand is framed; the larger one defines the governance 
domain (e.g., “trade and environment” instead of just “climate change”), the more 
fragmented it inevitably becomes. 
This brings us to a first set of questions: Why do some issues give way to integrated 
regimes and others to fragmented governance architectures? How do regime complexes 
behave and evolve over time? Are they a temporary aberration or a stable equilibrium? Few 
studies outside of the environmental sphere have examined the origins of institutional 
overlap and regime complexes. Here, it could be instructive to look at the literature on 
institutional linkages as developed by Oran Young in relation to GEG. Contrary to regime 
theory’s long-standing emphasis on the stickiness of institutions, Young suggests that the 
choice of arenas for regime formation is not self-evident but a product of organizational 
imperatives and interest calculations (Young 2002). Just as international institutions are 
erected and designed to further actors’ goals (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001), 
institutional overlap can emerge intentionally because actors actually benefit from a 
fragmented governance architecture. This foundational work can help to shed light on the 
question of when actors decide to stay within or diverge from a certain institutional path.  
Relatedly, GEG scholars have started to examine whether certain common 
trajectories, patterns or life-cycles can be observed in the long-term historical development 
of regimes and institutional complexes (Young 2010). Morin and Orsini (2013) propose that 
complexes evolve in several different stages, driven by internal conflicts and reaching 
internal stability and regime integration in the final stage. They further suggest that this 
gradual regime integration process goes hand in hand with greater policy coherence at the 
national level. The rapid emergence of environmental ministries in the wake of the 1972 UN 
Conference on the Human Environment, for example, created new administrative units that 
in turn supported greater coherence and integration at the national and international policy 
levels. In a similar vein, and inspired by ideas from biological ecology, Gehring and Faude 
(2010) contend that institutional complexes eventually lead to an internal division of labor, 
driven by competition over regulatory authority and resources.  
Keohane and Victor (2011), by contrast, argue that the fragmented climate change 
architecture is likely to persist since it is the product of three interactive and relatively stable 
forces: Strong interest divergence among major actors, high uncertainty about the 
distribution of gains and risks from international cooperation, and the fact that governments 
have not found productive linkages between all the cooperation problems in climate change. 
Yet, according to Johnson and Urpelainen (2012), it is not such productive linkages or 
positive spill-overs that will lead states to integrate international regimes, but rather their 
desire to mitigate negative spill-overs.3 The climate change and ozone regimes, on the one 
hand, are relatively integrated because to heal the ozone layer, countries banned certain 
ozone-depleting substances but subsequently adopted substitutes that are potent greenhouse 
gases (i.e., negative spill-over); hence, the need for integration. The climate change and forest 
regimes, on the other hand, appear suitable for integration since forests are natural carbon 
sinks (i.e. positive spill-over); yet these regimes have remained separate because the group of 
potential cooperating states as a whole benefits from allowing subgroups to invest in 
respective pet projects rather than forcing them all to invest in projects that some subgroups 
view coolly.  
In other words, there is disagreement among GEG scholars about the conditions 
under which regime integration or separation will carry the day. It is worth testing those 
contrasting hypotheses into other empirical areas beyond the environment. For example, 
                                                            
3 “Negative spill-overs” are defined as situations where cooperation in one issue area undermines the 
pursuit of objectives in another issue area. 
why is there a relatively centralized international trade regime structured around the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) but no World Energy Organization? As they continue to grow 
economically, will China and India keep up with the Bretton Woods institutions in which 
their voting power is restrained, or will they create or strengthen countervailing institutions, 
leading to fragmentation? Why did the United States and partner countries choose to 
develop the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement as a standalone agreement, outside of 
existing organizations such as the WTO or WIPO? Similarly, what exactly triggered the 
decision in 2001 to create the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria as a 
separate organization outside of the World Bank and existing UN agencies? 
Another question where greater interaction between scholars of global governance 
and the GEG community could be fruitful relates to the normative judgment of regime 
complexes. Should we think of such complexes in positive or negative terms? A few studies 
of non-GEG scholars have focused on the strategic responses of states and other actors to 
institutional complexes. Scholars have argued that such complexes enable powerful states to 
engage in forum-shopping, regime-shifting and other cross-institutional strategies which 
could lead to a broader shift in global governance from rules-based to power-based 
outcomes (Alter and Meunier 2009). In other words, these scholars tend to see regime 
complexes in quite negative terms. 
GEG scholars, on the other hand, have been debating the pros and cons of greater 
centralization for years, notably in the form of creating a World Environment Organization, 
an idea that is as fiercely advocated by some as it is opposed by others (e.g. Whalley and 
Zissimos 2001; Charnovitz 2002; Najam 2003). Some recent studies from the subfield of 
GEG are remarkably optimistic about regime complexes. Keohane and Victor (2011), for 
example, argue that regime complexes might actually offer some advantages over single, 
legally-integrated regimes, such as greater flexibility (across issues) and adaptability (across 
time). Johnson and Urpelainen similarly think of regime complexes in quite benign terms, 
arguing that “regime separation is not necessarily a failure in institutional design or a failure 
to facilitate cooperation. On the contrary, it can serve as a design strategy that promotes 
cooperation” (2012: 673).  
Finally, we draw attention to the concept of “interplay management” which has 
hitherto only been applied in an environmental context. The term refers to conscious efforts 
by actors to “address and improve institutional interaction and its effects” (Oberthür and 
Stokke 2011: 6). In a global governance galaxy that is growing denser and more complex 
across the board, these kinds of management efforts could become more important. The 
“clustering” of agreements, for example, is a specific mode of institutional management that 
has been observed in the environmental sphere, notably with regard to the international 
chemicals and waste treaties (Moltke 2001). The parties to the three major conventions of 
the regime (Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions) have gradually synchronized 
their institutional structures – even up to the point of having a joint executive secretary. 
Especially issue areas with a relatively high density of international arrangements (e.g., health, 
clean energy, and ‘WTO+’ agreements in international trade) could provide fertile ground 
for testing some of the assertions from the existing research on the types, standards and 
conditions of interplay management. 
In conclusion, the literature on GEG has opened up important new ways of thinking 
about international institutional interaction in the past 10-15 years. The concepts of regime 
complexes and interplay management are particularly promising research avenues that hold 
important lessons for global governance in general. The application of these concepts to 
new, non-environmental domains promises large theoretical payoffs as it would increase the 
external validity of the propositions. Investigating both positive cases of regime complexes 
and negative ones (i.e. issue areas where there are no overlapping regimes) in areas beyond 
GEG might in turn help to understand environmental politics better. 
 
 
Vertical Linkages and Scale 
 
KATE O’NEILL 
University of California at Berkeley 
 
A recent wave of GEG research examines how governance institutions and actors 
are connecting and working across multiple jurisdictional levels, from local to global, and 
vice versa. As with research on horizontal linkages in GEG (see Van de Graaf and De Ville, 
above), this work demonstrates the complexity and interconnectedness of global governance 
institutions, albeit in these cases the linkages are best described as vertical – between levels 
of analysis. As cited in the introduction to this forum, it is a good example of scholarship 
that is inspired by and relates to broader IR literature on domestic-international linkages, 
levels of analysis and multi-level governance. Even so, it draws on concepts that come from 
different disciplinary traditions and examines actors and processes that have previously been 
accorded only marginal roles in mainstream IR. Not only does it bring a particular multi-
level dimension to GEG theory, this work also emphasizes recognizing fluidity, complexity 
and nestedness (Young 1996) as key characteristics of global governance institutions – and 
that influential actors, ideas and initiatives may emerge from unexpected realms.   
 In very simple terms, the concept of “vertical linkage” applies to instances of 
governance across jurisdictional levels, and/or the movement of ideas, knowledge or policy 
up and down between these levels. The development and functioning of regional centers 
under the global chemicals treaties are a good example of such multilevel governance 
initiatives (Selin 2010). The growing role of cities, local governments and other sub-state 
entities in encouraging greenhouse gas mitigation and building transnational networks for 
sustainable development illustrates the emergence of local political actors in global political 
spaces, especially when national governments are absent or weak (Betsill and Bulkeley 2006; 
Koehn 2008; Selin and VanDeveer 2009; Bouteligier 2012). Cases of the incorporation of 
local or indigenous knowledge in, for example, biodiversity negotiations have highlighted 
how ideas, knowledge and expertise may flow not only downwards, from the global level, 
but also upwards, informing how global policies are created and strengthened (Martello 
2001, Jasanoff and Martello 2004). The “new regionalism” in GEG (Balsiger and VanDeveer 
2012) and new political architectures, such as the Reducing Emissions through Deforestation 
and Degradation (REDD+) program being designed and enacted under the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Doherty and Schroeder 2011), have drawn 
attention to linkages across multiple sites at local, regional and global levels in GEG. These 
instances may be nested (such as regional centers nested within a broader chemicals regime), 
or separate institutions focusing on the same problem on different scales (Cities for Climate 
Protection and the UNFCCC), or indeed a single institution operating simultaneously across 
levels (REDD+). 
These studies – and their findings – are significant for several reasons. First, in 
common with literature on regime complexes (see Van de Graaf and De Ville above), they 
demonstrate that GEG consists of a dense set of interlocking institutions that go beyond 
negotiating and implementing individual regimes from the international level. Second, they 
provide insight into questions that have long concerned international organizations 
themselves: the actual or perceived disconnect between decisions taken by policy elites at the 
global level and their reception by local and regional communities. Third, with the 
emergence of new sorts of institutional formations reaching across governance scales, such 
as REDD+, carbon markets, or regional emissions trading schemes, scholars face a 
challenging imperative to visualize and understand new phenomena that do not conform to 
traditional theoretical framings. Attention to vertical linkages helps make sense of the 
emergence and influence of new actors who come primarily from “local” levels of 
governance. Similarly, such work helps us see how to address issues such as fresh water 
provision that rarely make it onto the international policy agenda (Conca 2006), or global, 
multi-level phenomena such as natural resource commodity chains (Havice and Campling 
2010). 
This newer work on vertical linkages in GEG departs from earlier levels of analysis 
and domestic-international linkages literature in IR theory in important ways. First, it 
incorporates more levels of governance – local, national, regional and global and their 
associated actors – that interact and have agency at all stages of governance and negotiation 
processes. They are more than political constraints during negotiations or passive sites of 
regime implementation. Second, although domestic-international linkages work is alive and 
well, as is work on multilateral governance in the European Union, it remains state-centric 
and connected to the study of formal, hierarchical institutions. This work does not privilege 
one level over another, addressing instead their interactions, and the movement of ideas, 
actors, knowledge and policies up and down between them.  
A primary reason for this departure is that GEG research has integrated insights 
from other (inter)disciplinary social science perspectives. Geographers, political ecologists, 
anthropologists and others have done extensive work on concepts of scale and local-global 
connections that provide insight into how to study and analyze these phenomena (e.g. 
Marston 2000; Bulkeley 2005; McCarthy 2005; Reed and Bruyneel 2010). Scale remains a 
somewhat difficult concept to pin down, but the works cited here work primarily with a 
jurisdictional concept of scale, along which are placed the different levels (global, local, 
regional, etc.). Other sorts of scales might be ecological or temporal (Gibson et al 2000). 
They point out the importance of understanding how scales are constructed, not given 
(Marson 2000), and the perils of trying to situate a problem or a governance institution as 
purely local or purely global without understanding the interconnections (Görg and 
Rauschmayer 2009). 
The applications of such work to other arenas of global governance are manifold. 
Notwithstanding, a review of major IR journals over the past three years – International 
Organization, International Studies Quarterly, Review of International Political Economy and Global 
Governance – reveals a dearth of articles that address these themes directly (for exceptions, see 
Aggarwal and Chow 2010; Su 2012).  However, the orderly hierarchies and well-defined 
actor roles of traditional IR theory are being disrupted. Most international agreements and 
global governance arrangements operate at multiple levels, and institutional complexity and 
feedbacks, as well as fluidity and the capacity to adapt are hallmarks of many global 
governance initiatives. Security studies, in paying greater attention to terrorist/insurgent 
groups and civil wars, has to understand how dynamics play out at very local levels in Iraq, 
Afghanistan or the Congo to influence national and international decisions. Migration 
studies, the global political economy of trade and distribution of economic power, and the 
growing literature on policy and norm diffusion could also utilize insights from GEG work 
on vertical linkages and scale.  
Of course, incorporating insights from literature on vertical linkages and scale into 
the IR canon will pose challenges, particularly methodological ones. Researchers will often 
need to adapt methods from other disciplines, including multi-site methods (ethnographic or 
otherwise), network analysis, and more collaborative data-gathering and analysis techniques 
(O’Neill et al, 2013, in press). Nonetheless, IR scholars have an important role to play in 
understanding and analyzing these new arenas of multi-scale governance. There are many 
exciting new directions for this sort of research, especially that enables collaboration 
between GEG and other IR researchers on cross-cutting problems, such as climate change, 
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In the 1990s IR scholars began to develop the notion of “private authority” and the 
related idea of “private regimes” to analyze the growth of cross-border governance by non-
state actors. Across a range of issue areas, it seemed new forms of private regulation 
involving varying constellations of businesses and nongovernmental organizations were 
playing an increasingly prominent role in global affairs. For some IR scholars the steady 
increase in the power and legitimacy of private actors and institutions signaled a fundamental 
shift in the nature of global governance. Susan Strange (1996) saw the rise of private 
authority as a sign that the state was “defective” or in “retreat”; others, such as David Held 
(2000), believed we were witnessing a “transformation” of politics and state power. Since 
then scholars across the field of IR have been debating the nature and impact of the changes 
taking place. 
By far the most ambitious studies of private authority — and the most energetic 
debates over the relative importance of non-state actors and institutions — have been 
occurring inside the subfield of GEG. Part of the reason for this has been the extent to 
which private regimes have proliferated since the early 1990s across nearly all environmental 
issue areas (Falkner 2003). This has, effectively, turned the study of environmental politics 
into a valuable laboratory for testing hypotheses about the larger changes in the global 
system that so concerned Strange and Held. And, with so much going on, GEG theories of 
private authority are among the best developed, offering many insights for IR theory more 
broadly. 
In general, scholars of GEG accept some version of the following definition, which 
would be familiar enough to those studying other issue areas: private authority is said to exist 
when non-state actors (such as firms or NGOs) create rules or standards that other actors in 
world politics accept or comply with. Those accepting or complying with private regulations 
can be either states or other non-state actors, or both. Importantly, as scholarship in the 
subfield of GEG has made clear, when private authority is present it can take a number of 
forms. Each is distinguished, largely, by the way in which private authority comes about. We 
discuss three ways.  
The first variety of private authority is what Green (2010b) calls “entrepreneurial 
authority.” Entrepreneurial authority arises when private actors create rules or standards, 
usually to fill a “governance gap” (see Ohta and Ishii below), which others then adopt. The 
rules themselves can take a variety of forms, but all are created without an explicit mandate 
or support from public actors. Among the most common examples within the subfield of 
GEG are ISO 14001 and Forest Stewardship Council certification (Prakash and Potoski 
2006; Cashore et al. 2004). These and related standards have also been shown to operate in a 
distinctive “market-driven” fashion wherein schemes compete with one another for 
dominance in a given issue area (Bernstein and Cashore 2007; Smith and Fischlein 2010). 
However, states have also occasionally sought to establish private authority by 
explicitly delegating rule-making authority to private actors. An example of this second kind 
of “delegated authority” arises when states task private agents with the job of auditing or 
monitoring compliance with international agreements. Private actors are also sometimes 
delegated the task of creating rules for themselves and others. This is the case, for instance, 
with the Clean Development Mechanism, where a few firms validate and verify carbon 
offsets on behalf of states, but are also able to propose new offsetting methodologies (Green 
2008). Above all, what is distinctive here is the hierarchical principal-agent relationship 
between the actors involved, and, usually, the lack of competition between rules. 
The third variant is “hybrid authority,” which emerges when public and private 
actors join forces to form transnational rules. This resembles delegated authority in that both 
public and private actors are involved, but it is conceptually distinct because the relations 
between them are not hierarchical. Rather, public and private actors cooperate horizontally 
and bring complementary capabilities to the task of rule making. In this respect, it is more 
akin to entrepreneurial authority. Perhaps the most common form of hybrid authority 
involves the creation of public-private partnerships, generally between international 
organizations and businesses (see Andonova 2010). But another interesting form emerges 
when states or international organizations seek to shape (or “orchestrate”) existing 
“markets” of entrepreneurial authority (see Hale and Roger 2012). 
Theoretically, the emphasis of GEG research on private authority has been on 
explaining how and why different kinds of private authority come about. At least two major 
strands of explanations have dominated the literature. The first is largely functionalist, 
focusing on the benefits which transnational rules offer different actors. Perhaps the most 
well developed arguments of this type have been those advanced by scholars like Prakash 
and Potoski (2006) and Baron (2009), who argue that many transnational rules are akin to 
“clubs” and serve as signaling devices that convey information to consumers. This 
information helps consumers to more easily identify and reward “virtuous” goods and firms, 
therefore making it possible for firms to internalize the costs involved. The presence of 
market failures and the potential for such benefits explain why private authority emerges in 
some areas but not others.  
By contrast, the second group of theories puts more emphasis on the structures 
within which transnational rules arise. One notable example of this kind of argument is that 
advanced by Dingwerth and Pattberg (2009), who argue that an “organizational field” of 
transnational rules developed in the early 1990s and structured incentives and mindsets such 
that other groups in a variety of environmental issue areas then tended to adopt similar 
solutions. Others, such as Bartley (2007), have suggested that the driving force behind 
private authority has been the changing character of the conflicts among states, NGOs and 
businesses. These conflicts have, in turn, determined the nature of institution building in the 
global economy. 
We argue that the cutting edge of research on private authority is now focused on 
developing testable hypotheses that build upon both functional and structural theories. 
Green’s (2010a, 2010b) work has been especially promising. Private authority, she argues, 
tends to emerge when both “demand” for it exists and when actors are willing and able to 
“supply” private regimes. Her account of “demand” builds upon functionalist theories of the 
role of private authority that emphasize first-mover advantages, the lowering of transaction 
costs, the credibility of commitments, and so on. But demand is only met, in her theory, 
when a public agent cannot supply the same benefits as a private one. A private actor, she 
argues, must have certain relative governance advantages, usually derived from their 
autonomy, or from moral or expert authority.  
Given demand, private authority can, however, be supplied in several ways. In her 
theory, authority can be delegated (giving rise to delegated authority) or it can emerge more 
spontaneously (giving rise to entrepreneurial authority). For Green, two structural variables 
explain which form of private authority will tend to arise: the preferences of powerful states 
and the existence (or non-existence) of a focal actor. If the preferences of powerful states 
converge on a course of action (meaning they reach consensus on an appropriate agent and 
can give them clear instructions), they are more likely to delegate authority to a private 
“global governor.” Conversely, if they disagree and no focal actor exists, Green’s theory 
predicts that entrepreneurial governance is more likely to emerge. 
Hale and Roger (2012) build on this framework to explain the emergence of hybrid 
authority, particularly orchestration. For them, entrepreneurial authority is not necessarily the 
only outcome when state preferences diverge. Moreover, entrepreneurial authority may fail 
to arise due to high transaction costs, inadequate legal arrangements, and imperfect 
information. However, under certain conditions, international organizations or states may 
step in to resolve such problems in order to “unlock” the agency of transnational actors. 
States and international organizations may also try to shape established forms of 
entrepreneurial authority. All of this is most likely to occur when international organizations 
have the autonomy to take action despite opposing state preferences, perhaps because states 
have delegated autonomy or because of agency slack (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Hawkins et al. 
2006). Whether an international organization attempts to create a partnership or shape 
existing forms of private authority depends, in turn, on whether or not a focal 
entrepreneurial initiative already exists. 
Green’s theory of private authority and Hale and Roger’s extension are two examples 
of how the literature on private authority in GEG is starting to place greater emphasis on 
developing testable hypotheses with the potential to predict both when transnational 
governance will emerge and the form it is likely to take when it does. Such efforts are also 
important because they promise to (re)integrate theories of private authority within the 
broader corpus of IR theories, demonstrating how private authority arises in response to or 
as a result of state behavior. To assess its wider value, however, will require testing these 
theories across other issues areas, such as finance, law, health, or security.  
Extending these theories to analyze transgovernmental networks could also perhaps 
lay the basis for a more general theory of transnational governance; that is, a theory that 
accounts for the rise of a wide variety of innovative institutional forms. Transgovernmental 
networks, as Slaughter (2001) notes, arise under seemingly similar conditions: sometimes in 
an “entrepreneurial” manner, in response to inadequate multilateral cooperation, and 
sometimes under the auspices of an intergovernmental agreement—that is, via delegation. 
Hence, connecting theories of private authority with theories of transgovernmental networks 
would seem to harbor considerable potential for researchers looking for insights into future 
directions in IR theory. 
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The study of GEG can contribute toward debunking a persistent – but rarely explicit 
– myth, sometimes called the “linear model” (Koetz et al. 2012) or the “rational instrumental 
approach” (Gulbrandsen 2010). According to this myth, expert knowledge – that 
encompasses but is not limited to scientific knowledge – should precede politics. As such, 
GEG has significant theoretical and policy contributions to offer to other subfields of IR, 
such as international political economy. Constructivist scholarship so rarely claims policy-
relevance that it would be unfortunate not to pay attention. 
The myth that expert knowledge should precede politics can be broken down into 
three related and equally flawed assumptions. The first is ontological and opposes knowledge 
and politics as two antithetical spheres. According to this dichotomy, expert knowledge is 
perceived as being ideally consensual, neutral, and universal, while politics is deemed 
essentially conflictual, partial, and contextual. The second assumption is normative and 
argues for a strict division of labor, according to which experts should supply and 
policymakers consume knowledge. The third assumption is analytic and results from the 
tension between the previous two. It explains governance failures by the tendency of 
policymakers to follow their political interests rather than knowledge-based solutions.  
On the face of it, GEG provides an easy case for the linear model since relevant 
environmental knowledge is often scientific knowledge, which is supposed to be the 
quintessential of consensual, neutral and universal knowledge. Yet, a close look at GEG 
reveals that scientific evidence is not a pre-condition for political action. The 1987 Montreal 
Protocol, for example, was negotiated when the magnitude of the ozone layer degradation 
was still in dispute (Litfin 1995). Conversely, international cooperation on deforestation 
remains particularly weak although its causes and remedies are well known (Dimitrov 2006). 
In some cases, knowledge can even impede cooperation. The profusion of scientific 
indicators and measurement techniques has complicated rather than facilitated negotiations 
over Baltic Sea pollution (Auer 2010). Likewise, recent studies suggest that scientific literacy 
does not necessarily increase consensus on environmental policies but may rather feed 
polarization (Kahan et al. 2012). Thus, cooperation is not always driven by science, and 
obstacles to cooperation are not always the results of dirty political games.  
One of the first challenges to the linear model came from the epistemic community 
literature in the early 1990s (Haas 1992). By portraying experts as political actors, driven by 
principled beliefs and pursuing a common policy enterprise, the introduction of the concept 
of epistemic community disputed the clear demarcation between expertise and politics. To 
be sure, the influence of expertise on politics is not limited to cold, value-neutral 
technicalities. Scientists and other experts are political when they frame ozone depletion 
above the Antarctic as a “hole”, present a 2-degree temperature rise as a “reasonable target”, 
or name a geological period “anthropocene.” They are also political when they define what 
should be considered as credible, authoritative and legitimate knowledge, be it a United 
Nations report, an Inuit pharmacopeia, or the controversial book The Skeptical 
Environmentalist. 
The epistemic community literature, however, has been criticized for neglecting the 
political dynamics underlying the scientific process (Litfin 1995). While it successfully 
highlighted the direct involvement of expertise in politics, it has failed to theorize the 
politicization of knowledge and the continually contested boundaries between the two fields. 
Not only does political action mobilize expert knowledge, but the production of such 
knowledge is itself, as a social practice, contingent on the political context, and it inescapably 
possesses a political dimension. Several studies have found a bias in environmental 
knowledge toward the interests of the most powerful actors. Climate change research has 
initially focused on mitigation rather than adaptation (Parikh 1992); water science remains 
fascinated by the water war hypothesis but under-documents low sanitation coverage (Gupta 
and van der Zaag 2009); and desertification research emphasizes local as opposed to 
transnational causes (Martello 2004). As a result, most contemporary GEG scholars 
recognize that scientific knowledge and political order shape one another through a co-
production process (Lemos and Morehouse 2005). Research and international negotiations 
interact continuously, one orienting the agenda of the other. Best documented cases of such 
an interactive process are transboundary air pollution (Lidskog and Sundqvist 2002; Tuinstra 
et al. 2006), the ozone layer (e.g. Parson 2004), and climate-change regimes (e.g. Miller and 
Edwards 2001). All conclude that science/expertise does not precede politics, but co-evolves 
with it. 
The coproduction theory does not imply that all scientific claims have the same 
value, that we should abandon the distinction between expert knowledge and politics, or that 
policy should not be grounded on scientific and other knowledge. Far from being cynical or 
relativist, it is rather a useful reminder that science and expert knowledge alone cannot solve 
political problems.  
Several GEG scholars have argued that the values that inescapably underlie expert 
knowledge should be fully articulated and adjudicated through political means. The scientific 
method and the peer-review process cannot arbitrate ethical issues, such as the level of risk 
tolerance, the primacy of long-term objectives, the balance between individual and collective 
interests, or the distribution of effort and costs. Only politics can directly address these 
issues and guide research accordingly. If done properly, politics can ultimately enhance 
science’s saliency and legitimacy, without necessarily undermining its credibility. At the same 
time, science and research need to communicate their own culture of doubt and uncertainty 
to decision-makers (e.g. Andresen et al. 2000; Guston 2001; Cash et al. 2003). 
Consistent with the GEG institutionalist inclination mentioned in the introduction of 
this forum, GEG scholars have found that certain “boundary organizations,” i.e. institutions 
at the interface between science and politics, can favor greater cooperation between the two 
fields, while keeping them separate. There are various types of boundary organizations, and 
their design affects their capacity to favor a fruitful science-policy dialogue and interaction. 
The highly interactive Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services 
may be a promising — though unproven — model (Koetz et al. 2012), while the expert 
advisory processes of the Convention to Combat Desertification are based on the linear 
model’s premises and do not appear to design the science-politics relationship as a socially 
meaningful two-way street (Martello 2004).  
Some boundary work can also be done outside of formal boundary organizations. 
More specific instruments favoring a science-policy dialogue include the joint identification 
of international environmental indicators (e.g. Auer 2010), multi-stakeholder certification 
schemes (e.g. Gulbrandsen 2010), mutual capacity building among researchers from 
developed and developing countries (e.g. Sagar and VanDeveer 2006), deliberative forms of 
environmental democracy (e.g. Hobson 2009), open discussion of the assumptions 
underlying scenarios and computer models (e.g. Pulver and VanDeveer 2009), and 
collaborative panels for scientific assessment reports (e.g. Weichselgartner and Kasperson 
2010). Social interaction between political and scientific actors can lead to mutual learning, 
shared understanding, and collective action. 
Admittedly, there is no simple solution, and the design of the interface between 
expert knowledge and politics cannot be expected to be a panacea. During the transition 
from the Soviet Union to the Russian Federation, for example, increased involvement of 
scientists has not led to more environmental protection (Ostergren and Jacques 2002). But 
recent work in GEG studies suggests that expert knowledge which is socially and politically 
embedded tends to support innovative policy, stringent regulation, and international 
cooperation. 
This idea of a coproduction of expert knowledge and politics, prevalent in GEG 
studies, could be transplanted to other subfields of IR in which authoritative knowledge 
claims are made. Hard science and scientific uncertainty are not scope conditions, notably 
because the boundary of the former and the assessment of the latter are socially constructed. 
For example, economics and economic policymaking could be analyzed under the 
coproduction framework. The influence of economic paradigms on policymaking is already 
well documented, especially Keynesian liberalism in the post-war period and neo-liberalism 
in the 1980s. Too often, however, paradigm shifts are presented as the result of exogenous 
shocks, such as the Great Depression in the 1930s or stagflation in the 1970s (Morin and 
Carta 2013). The prevalence of certain methods, assumptions, and paradigms in economics 
is rarely understood as a political process. International political economy is still largely 
caught in the linear model in which knowledge precedes politics.  
From a policy angle, several issues-areas may benefit from a proper boundary 
institution to appropriately arrange the knowledge-politics interface as a two-way street by 
facilitating the integration of expertise into politics and vice versa. The World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO), for example, currently faces a legitimacy crisis. Several 
NGOs and developing countries have come to see WIPO as being biased toward the 
interests of intellectual property (IP) holders (Morin 2013). In this context, open debates on 
assumptions underlying IP law and economics, the establishment of an intergovernmental 
panel on IP's social and economic impacts, and more transparent capacity-building programs 
could increase WIPO’s salience, legitimacy and credibility.  
It is unlikely that strengthening the interface between expert knowledge and politics 
in global governance would reduce uncertainty. It would rather make uncertainty apparent 
and inescapable, and help allocate political responsibility where it belongs, as politically 
uncomfortable as that may be. The experience of GEG suggests that acknowledging and 
embracing the complex relations between expert knowledge and politics is necessary to make 
their relation mutually supportive.  
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Transparency is a widely used concept in debates on international politics, from 
transnational anti-corruption campaigns to renewed requests for greater disclosure on health, 
finance, or even security issues. Calls for transparency date back at least to the League of 
Nations, when internationalists demanded open diplomacy. Yet, it is in the subfield of GEG, 
and its developments on non-state actors as a key research topic (see introduction), where 
the practice and theory of transparency has made the most profound inroads (Gupta 2010a). 
GEG has been a particularly fertile ground for the development of informational 
governance (Mol 2008) and the rise of numerous transparency initiatives which have been 
analyzed in a rapidly developing literature. Importantly, current GEG research is also highly 
relevant for other IR subfields. For one, recent GEG research can help IR scholars to 
further refine the concept of transparency and to increase conceptual clarity and 
sophistication. Second, research on GEG has improved our understanding of the factors 
that determine the effectiveness of transparency as a governance tool in international 
politics.  
Transparency can be defined as any attempt to reduce secrecy by bringing 
information to a wider audience. To be qualified as a transparency initiative, the circulating 
information must be accompanied by two other important features. First, the information to 
be made available must have been previously inaccessible. Second, the provision of this 
information must occur voluntarily, that is, by mutual consent (otherwise it is considered as 
denunciation, as for instance in the Wikileaks controversy).  
Current GEG research further differentiates between two additional dimensions of 
transparency. First, the transparency of processes, an area that has been widely studied in 
international politics, especially regarding the openness of negotiations (Stavasage 2004).  
Second, substantive transparency, that is, the information that is actually reported or disclosed. 
Among mechanisms that seek to address substantive transparency, one can further 
distinguish between information that is provided to public authorities and information that 
targets consumers and the market. GEG has been particularly prolific in creating 
mechanisms in both categories.  
To cite a few examples in the first category, the Protocol on Pollutant Release and 
Transfer Registers to the Aarhus Convention, in force since 8 October 2009, is the first 
legally binding international instrument that grants access to pollution inventory information. 
Likewise, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, finalized in 2000, adopted the key “prior 
informed consent” procedure (borrowed from the 1989 Basel Convention on hazardous 
wastes and the 1998 Rotterdam Convention on hazardous chemicals). By this procedure, 
countries exporting genetically modified organisms (GMOs) that can be introduced into the 
environment must inform importing states that their shipments contain such GMOs. A third 
example is the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit Sharing, which 
establishes an international certificate to be used as evidence that the genetic resources it 
covers have been accessed in accordance with domestic regulations. A final example is the 
REDD+ measures requiring states to disclose the terms and conditions of their agreements 
with forest-dependent communities (Lawlor et al. 2010). 
In addition to these initiatives that involve public authorities, GEG is also full of 
private transparency initiatives adopted by and for the market (see Roger and Dauvergne 
above). Highly innovative and influential examples are the Forest Stewardship Council and 
the Marine Stewardship Council, two partnerships between environmental NGOs and 
business associations to develop informative labels that may help consumers identify 
products that have been produced with lower environmental and social impacts. Other 
private initiatives include the Equator principles adopted by a group of banks in 2003 and 
asking major borrowers to disclose the environmental risks of their project and consult with 
local stakeholders. The underlying assumption behind all these mechanisms is that 
transparency can improve environmental performance. Researchers in GEG have shown 
that what citizens ignore can often have a great impact on their lives (Tienhaara 2006). But 
for substantive transparency to hold its promise, scholars realized that at least three 
parameters had to be controlled closely. 
First, recent research has shown that the quality of the disclosed information matters. 
Studies in the subfield of security had already established that too much information can 
have counterproductive effects (Finel and Lord 1999). Studies in GEG further indicate that 
the disclosed information should be as precise as possible. In the case of GMOs, for 
instance, exporting states only have to indicate that their shipments “may contain” GMOs, 
leaving the burden on importing states to develop complex infrastructures of sampling, 
testing and verification to determine which GMO in which precise quantity is actually 
contained in the shipment (Gupta 2010b). In this case, substantial transparency serves the 
already powerful actors. A similar conclusion can be drawn from the Aarhus Convention. 
Here, a fair amount of decisions regarding the disclosed information is left to the discretion 
of the parties concerned, undermining the effectiveness of the agreement (Mason 2010). In 
the same line, transparency aimed at the broader public does not always work. One reason is 
that the citizens who are expected to use the disclosed information may not understand the 
figures or may not have the resources to hold governments and elites accountable (Haufler 
2010). 
Second, looking at who discloses the information is also relevant for making 
transparency work as a governance tool. In the Aarhus Convention, most provisions target 
public authorities as opposed to private firms, which leaves key information protected by 
corporate secrecy rules (Mason 2010). Often, the actions taken are more effective when they 
come from the players themselves, rather than when they are imposed by third parties. This 
has been the case for large institutional investors such as pension funds and mutual funds 
with regard to the adoption of environmental reporting (Helleiner 2011). Moreover, national 
and local contexts matter because they impact on the choice of the actors and the channels 
through which information will be transmitted and interpreted (Florini 2010). 
Third, research shows that reputation is an important mechanism triggered by 
transparency. This explains why transparency directed at the market often works better than 
transparency aimed at public authorities. For instance, the reporting and disclosure of 
environmental information in the financial sector works mostly because reputational costs 
are involved (Helleiner 2010; Sievänen et al. 2012). However, this led some authors to 
suggest that disclosure of information to the market might not be appropriate for every 
policy domain. For instance, carbon disclosure might not significantly contribute to emission 
reduction because of low reputational risk in several sectors (Harmes 2011). And yet, the 
reputational effects of transparency are increasingly visible in other domains of international 
politics such as energy politics with oil companies (Gillies 2010).  
To conclude, over the past years GEG has developed a very rich and diverse 
literature on the role of transparency in increasing the effectiveness and legitimacy of 
international governance. This research has also shown, however, that “governance by 
disclosure” (Gupta 2010a) is highly complex, and that the effectiveness of transparency 
mechanisms heavily depends on information types, design attributes and problem 
characteristics. Importantly, the use of transparency as a tool does not fundamentally change 
power relations. Often, transparency empowers the players who already had the capacities to 
master information and to interpret it (see Morin and Oberthür above). As a result, 
transparency cannot replace classical governmental regulations, and its use can only partially 
improve compliance and effectiveness (see Ohta and Ishii above).  
Most GEG research on transparency builds on qualitative analysis of particular 
transparency initiatives. In the future, therefore, more systematic large-n analyses could help 
refine the state of knowledge. In addition, transparency tools could be compared to other 
governance solutions (environmental targets, environmental clauses in private contracts, 
etc.). By no means is transparency unique to the subfield of GEG. Accordingly, we see 
ample opportunities for mutual interchange between scholars of GEG and students of other 












Existing institutions seem unable to bring about sustainable development (Biermann 
et al. 2012). There is a clear consensus on the current state of institutional deficiencies but 
there are many ongoing heated debates on how to improve them. For example, some argue 
that a World Environment Organization is necessary to improve GEG’s effectiveness, while 
others argue that it is better to cluster institutions according to different issue areas to 
generate synergistic effects among them (see Van de Graaf and De Ville above). This has led 
to the development of a fruitful literature within GEG on the effectiveness and determinants 
of international institutions.  
Effectiveness is a complex and multi-dimensional concept (Young 1999). Initially, 
the level of compliance with and implementation of agreements was used as a proxy to 
measure the level of effectiveness (Chayes and Chayes 1995; Weiss and Jacobson 1998). It is 
interesting to note that while Weiss and Jacobson emphasize the importance of both 
intention to comply and ability to comply, Chayes and Chayes underscore the lack of ability 
to comply with international regulation. They propose a “managerial” model of compliance 
with international regulations as an alternative to an “enforcement” model through 
examination of a wide range of cases across issue areas from arms control, human rights, 
labor, the environment, monetary policy, to international trade. In this way they set a 
precedent for the application of regime effectiveness studies beyond environmental 
concerns.  
Several dimensions of regime effectiveness have to be taken into consideration for its 
definition: behavioral change, efficiency and equity, problem-solving, goal attainment, as well 
as procedural, constitutive, and evaluative effectiveness. Although the most obvious effect of 
international environmental regimes is to solve the problem in question, there are only few 
cases that clearly show any improvement of the environment except for the ozone regime 
and the international regulation of oil pollution of the sea. The latter regime became very 
effective after changing the regulatory approach from the well-defined rules regarding the 
discharge of ballast from tankers to a system of equipment standards and port facilities 
(Mitchell 1994).  
Another way of looking at effectiveness is to observe the behavioral changes of 
states or private institutions that are concerned with certain international environmental 
regulations. However, we should be careful before claiming a causal relationship between an 
environmental regime and the observed behavioral change. For example, a careful 
assessment is called for regarding whether or not international efforts to regulate the 
production and consumption of ozone depletion substances such as chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs) spurred by the discovery of the ozone hole drove manufacturers to invest in research 
on CFC substitutes. An alternative explanation might hold that the producers reduced CFC 
production because of the incentive to gain profits from the sale of CFC substitutes, 
regardless of the presence or absence of international regulation (Bernauer 1995: 373). 
A classic mixed method analysis of regime effectiveness is the Miles Project (Miles et 
al. 2002), based on Underdal (2002), which proposes a framework setting dependent 
variables such as output, outcome and impact, and independent variables such as the 
character of problems—benign and malign—and problem-solving capacity, Miles and his 
colleagues came up with ordinal scales to measure regime effectiveness (Miles et al. 2002). 
On the other hand, the so-called Oslo-Potsdam solution proposes to evaluate regime 
effectiveness in terms of how close a regime is to the collective optimum, or in other words, 
how far the regime is from the non-regime counterfactual (Helm and Sprinz 2000). Mitchell 
emphasizes the importance of the per-unit-effort dimension in evaluating regime 
effectiveness in order to distinguish between easy and difficult (low-cost and high-cost) 
effectiveness improvement (Mitchell 2002). 
The existing literature shows that the regime effectiveness concept can be transferred 
to non-environment literature, although the main study field is still environmental issues. 
Stokke even proposes an innovative approach in his analysis of Barents Sea fisheries 
management (Stokke 2012). His innovative approach disaggregates regimes into three 
components—cognitional, regulatory, and behavioral aspects—and argues that this can 
enhance the policy-relevance, comparability, and accuracy of effectiveness research in 
general. In particular, this approach facilitates generating counterfactual situations by 
narrowing the analytical focus to those disaggregated components. By applying this 
approach, he convincingly argues that the effectiveness of the Barents Sea fisheries 
governance had gradually improved, with explanations of how the three regime components’ 
effectiveness contributed to or constrained the aggregated effectiveness. 
Other regime effectiveness studies in the non-environment field include Kelle’s study 
on the Chemical Weapon Control (CWC) regime (Kelle 2004) and Galbreath and McEvoy’s 
study on the European Minority Rights (EMR) regime (Galbreath and McEvoy 2012). The 
former evaluates the regime effectiveness of the CWC regime in terms of goal attainment 
and compliance and concludes that while the CWC regime seems to be effective as an infant 
regime, there is much potential for improvement in future implementation. The EMR 
regime was evaluated as having contributed to problem-solving but with some limitations. 
Galbreath and McEvoy explain that the limitations are due to high malignancy of the 
minority rights problem, the weakness of normative persuasion by relevant international 
organizations (e.g. Council of Europe), and the incongruence between policy 
implementation and state preferences. 
Recent quantitative studies in search of correlations among multiple independent 
variables (e.g. uncertainty and malignancy), some intervening variables (e.g. improvement of 
knowledge), and regime effectiveness (behavioral change, problem solving, and compliance) 
are promising in terms of their application to different issue areas (Miles et al. 2002; 
Breitmeier, Young, and Zürn 2006). However, further sophistication is needed, for instance, 
by incorporating domestic politics, power relations or other drivers of regime effectiveness 
into quantitative studies (Breitmeier, Underdal, and Young 2011). Similarly, regarding the 
utilization of the no-regime counterfactual for sorting out institutional effects, it is very 
important not to neglect “a number of driving forces—including a range of demographic, 
economic, political, and technological forces—” (Young 2001: 111) that affect the outcome. 
Additionally, a promising research direction regarding mixed method research would be to 
systematically combine quantitative and qualitative analysis by tracing the path from the 
independent to the dependent variable via a process-tracing technique so that the cause-and- 
effect relationship between those variables can be established together with statistical 
validity. Another promising research area would be to study the effectiveness of private 
regimes or authorities (see Roger and Dauvergne above). Gulbrandsen already indicates that 
the conceptualization of such effectiveness should be multi-dimensional and different from 
the problem solving approach focusing exclusively on intergovernmental institutions and 
state behavior (Gulbrandsen 2005; 2010). 
We are now able to produce some policy-relevant advice based on the existing 
literature (Young 2011), including that mentioned above. However, it is clear that in order to 
advance regime effectiveness research we must have more quantitative and qualitative 
analysis which takes the suggestions above into account. We must not forget that by 
conducting effectiveness research we are actually participating in the policymaking processes 
(see Morin and Oberthür above). At the same time, we believe that the aforementioned 
group of analyses helps us to remind ourselves of our responsibility for and the political 
implications of effectiveness research, and enables us to provide the policymaker 
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